So what’s the Fed going to do? The Fed doesn’t like to break things. The whole tapering process was designed to avoid that exact outcome. As always, back to the baseline. Based on the messaging prior to this meeting, the Fed intended for us to expect:
1. A tapering announcement, with tapering beginning in November and ending in the middle of next year, a pace of $15 billion per month, proportionately distributed between treasuries and MBS. This is operationally the same as $20 billion per meeting.
2. A reiteration of the basic “inflation is transitory” story with the acknowledgement that the process is taking longer than expected. I think the Fed needs to modify the language in the statement accordingly, but at the same time can’t drop the word “transitory.” If “transitory” is not in the statement, markets are going to overrun the Fed.
3. Powell will highlight the upside risks for inflation but will add that the Fed won’t know the true inflation story until at least the beginning of next year, more likely the end of the first quarter. The message is that the Fed intends to let the inflation story play out for some time yet.
4. Powell will continue to lean heavily on the inflation expectations story to justify the Fed’s faith in the “transitory inflation” forecast but at the same time will likely acknowledge the data implies greater inflation risks. The Fed likely thinks it already has room to maneuver because there is space between the end of the taper and the SEP-implied forecasts to pull rate hikes forward.
5. Powell will caution that structural changes to the labor market mean that labor force participation may not entirely return to pre-pandemic levels but add that the economy is still a long way from full employment. He will likely repeat his pre-blackout statement that reaching full employment by the latter half of next year is very possible. This is code for “it’s OK to price in rate hikes for the latter half of next year because we may hike rates if the data confirms full employment.”
6. Watch for Powell to say that “policy is in a good place.” Similarly, this is a signal that Powell isn’t ready to fight the markets, a sort of “we think our policy stance is correct and aren’t changing it for you.” Instead, Powell can see the risk relative to the September dots and doesn’t want to prevent markets from preparing for those dots to rise in the December and March SEPs. This would help avoid a surprise like that which occurred when the June SEPs were released.

Premier Li Keqiang, who is also the head of China’s National Energy Committee, presided over three meetings in Zhongnanhai over the last ten days.
In those meetings, he stressed that an unprecedented energy crunch is sweeping much of the world even before the Northern Hemisphere winter season fully sets in, when more electricity and heat will be needed in homes and in factories.
Li called on relevant departments under the State Council, and government at all levels, to work together to ensure that this winter the supply of electricity, coal, crude oil, and natural gas is fully guaranteed, electricity and heating for people’s livelihoods is guaranteed, and the normal operation of industrial and transportation production is ensured.

The Governing Council of the European Central Bank is scheduled to meet again on Thursday, October 28.

With important decisions on the future path of the ECB’s bond purchase programs looming at its subsequent, December meeting, the October meeting will serve mainly, in the words of one official, to “gauge the mood” around the table on inflation.
Our understanding is that these deliberations are likely to lead to a change in the wording of the language around inflation in the ECB’s communications. To what exactly, we are not sure, but the upside directionality of the inflation deliberations, and further upside forecast revisions come December, we believe are all but certain.

There will be plenty of Fed speak this week. I have my eyes on speeches by Governor Christopher Waller (Tuesday) and Vice Chair for Supervision Randal Quarles (Wednesday). Both will be talking about the economic outlook and should help gauge the direction of the Board; I am looking to see if they push the Board in a more hawkish direction; similarly, Governor Michelle Bowman gave a hawkish speech last week. In addition, Chair Jerome Powell will take part in a panel discussion on Friday hosted by the South African Reserve Bank. At this point, text and Q&A are to be determined. If the Fed is looking to tilt the discussion toward the hawkish side (more warnings about the persistence of inflation, medium term tightness in labor markets, need to protect against rising inflation expectations), we could see Quarles and Waller pave the way for Powell later in the week. Or Powell could push back on such talk, but it seems to be the overall direction.

The staff work for the next quarterly forecast revisions has not yet begun in earnest, but it appears that further revisions upwards of somewhere in the magnitude of 0.2% for next year, putting inflation at around 1.8%-1.9%, are likely again in December, which will also debut the 2024 forecasts. There will likely be upwards revisions to the 2021 and 2023 inflation forecasts as well.
That will necessitate changes in advance to how inflation pressures, these forecasts, and continued policy accommodation are characterized.
The hawks – and we hesitate to even use that term at the ultra-accommodative ECB — will note that the Governing Council agreed in its policy review this summer that it would incorporate the impact of Owner-Occupied Housing (OOH) into its decision making. As you will recall from previous SGH reports, this is estimated to add around 0.2% to inflation, even if Eurostat has not yet formally incorporated OOH into its inflation measures.
And so, miracle of miracles, come December the ECB it now appears will show a forecast by that measure effectively at or slightly above its 2% inflation target for next year. And that will open an interesting debate over overshoots, and for how long and by what magnitude the Governing Council will fuel, and let these inflationary pressures run.

...my opinion is that I doubt Ambassador Tai would use the CSIS forum to break ground on any high-level decision or shift on the existing tariff or trade regime in place, which I think would come in a formal announcement from the appropriate political levels depending on the intended magnitude of the announcement. But I do not pretend to be privy to what Ambassador Tai will say and am interested to hear.


But here is out take on the overall US-China trade/economic situation:
The administration will talk and stand tough on some important issues that the US needs/wants to address, unfair trade practices, transparency, subsidies, Taiwan, human rights, Uighurs, Hong Kong, all with less and less effect, but we believe the goal is to improve and de-escalate in general on economic issues. Why? Growth, economy, markets, consumers, increasing inflation and commodity, supply chain concerns, good old-fashioned profits and lobbying, they don’t like “Trump-era” tariffs really, would like to make the case that they have not been effective, can conduct a multi-faceted (as opposed to the old one track) policy designed to help the economy and working people, manufacturing, but tough on security issues. We have been writing this for a while, more or less, been quite a bit out there on it I have felt.
Often people get more rattled (albeit increasingly less so) by hawkish rhetoric, always they rightly cite the domestic US political difficulties to any easing with China, but which can be overcome with the right concession/cover, so we talk and speculate about how the trade plays out politically. Phase One will be declared dead at some point, I don’t know when, but we have thought there would be movement on trade before year end, which is not so far away now.
Massive, massive corporate lobbying (Chamber of Commerce, US China Business Council, etc.) and financial industry lobbying one might reasonably presume may come into play as well — how do I phrase this delicately! And there has been lots of communication/dialogue between American and Chinese notables, not just private sector participant/sponsored, but with officials as well.

As to more specific measures, our understanding is that China’s State Council approved an immediate expansion of coal imports, mainly from Russia, Mongolia, and Indonesia. (Note – Indonesia is China’s largest coal supplier, followed by Russia and Mongolia. China imports roughly 300 million tons of coal, which is around 10% of its total consumption).
The State Council also asked 20 provincial governments to implement differential electricity pricing for power usage peaks and valleys as part of a peak shifting power supply policy, and to provide subsidies to power generating enterprises.
It also urged coal producers to seek out and secure additional supplies.

Li stressed that electricity demand for high-tech companies must be absolutely guaranteed, even while it would be necessary to continue to impose power cuts on high energy consumption enterprises, as well as for enterprises temporarily relocated to China from Vietnam, Malaysia, and other ASEAN countries due to the Covid Delta variant.
Some provinces, he said, have been too rigid in meeting emissions reduction targets, in the process triggering harmful undulations for industrial production, and they would need to carry out the country’s “dual controls” and “dual restrictions” more prudently, with power outages only used as a last resort, and with advance warning, to prevent overall grid risks.

Regarding inflation, Brainard expects this year’s surge to be transitory, placing particular attention on used-car prices:

Next let's consider price stability. Inflation is currently elevated. This is creating challenges for consumers and businesses alike. But the high inflation readings from the spring and early summer were disproportionately driven by a few sectors experiencing specific supply bottlenecks. In May and June, new and used vehicle prices accounted for half of the outsized monthly increases in core consumer price index (CPI) inflation. These categories were lesser contributors in July, and in the August CPI their joint contribution declined to essentially zero, as prices finally began to retreat for used cars, offsetting increases in new car prices.

With that in mind, note this from Black Book:

Traditionally, as we move past Labor Day, values begin to decline, with the largest portion of the yearly depreciation typically occurring in the fourth quarter. However, that is not the case this year, we’ve now had four consecutive weeks of overall market increases in wholesale values. With new inventory not expected to improve until later into 2022, wholesale prices are anticipated to remain at elevated levels for the foreseeable future.

The seasonal factors will magnify used car price growth if they are again rising when seasonally they should be falling. Brainard recognizes such a possibility:

So, I expect inflation to decelerate, and pre-COVID inflation dynamics to return when COVID disruptions dissipate. But with Delta disrupting the rotation from goods to services and prolonging supply bottlenecks, it is uncertain just how fast and how much inflation will decelerate over the remainder of the year and into next year.

Looking ahead, my instinct is the Fed’s inflation forecast for 2021 is still too low; 3.7% feels like a minimum that I suspect depends on used car prices collapsing. The unemployment forecast for this year reflects the growing concern we had noted across the Fed that the labor force was not returning as quickly as expected, but now feels perhaps overly cautious to me. We are at 5.2% now; an exceptionally good report could take that to 4.8% in one fell swoop. Together that suggests that the December dots will move the majority expectations of a rate forecast to a full hike in 2022.

We expect Beijing will try to ensure a smooth transition of Evergrande’s portfolio but expect a relatively hard line when it comes to resolution of the firm’s debt load.

Importantly, the deal that is being negotiated between the US Department of Justice and Meng’s lawyers is part of a broad political push to lower tensions on the economic front between the United States and China – not that the justice system would be politicized, of course.
Our understanding is that since President Biden came to office, Beijing has brought up the US extradition case against Meng repeatedly in backchannel discussions, and in every discussion with senior US officials since the Sino-US talks in Anchorage, Alaska in March of 2021.
In fact, sources in Beijing indicate that Meng Wanzhou’s case was even brought up directly by China’s President Xi Jinping in his call two weeks ago with US President Joseph Biden.
The current state of play appears to be that the DoJ will drop the extradition case if Meng admits her guilt, which appears to be a stumbling block still, and agrees to pay a hefty fine, which seems, as one might suspect, less of an obstacle.
While direct linkage of the Meng case to US-China (and of course Canada-China) relations may seem rather unseemly, in the words of one admittedly hardline senior Chinese official, “If the Biden administration wants to seek China’s cooperation on climate, counter-terrorism, the economy and trade, the release of Meng is a necessary condition.”
Bellicose threats aside, we suspect this rhetoric is further corroboration that a resolution in the Meng case is close at hand.

This week’s FOMC meeting is turning into something of a nail biter with the dots being the main source of contention. The general expectation is that this next meeting is too early to announce a tapering decision. I concur; the likely outcome of this meeting is guidance that opens the door to tapering at a subsequent meeting.

On inflation, the core-PCE inflation forecast for 2021 will be at least 3.7%, a level well above what anyone on the Fed thinks is moderate, and the 2022 forecast, currently 2.1%, will rise to at least 2.2% (I think 2.3% but arguably that is an aggressive call), and 2023 will likely still be above 2% as well. That means the inflation surge is almost entirely transitory (in line with the Fed’s story) but with enough persistence to drive underlying inflation moderately above the Fed’s 2% target. This strikes me as a forecast in which the Fed is likely to achieve its objective of 2% average inflation with expectations of continued above target inflation (certainly the new policy framework is sufficiently undefined and flexible to admit such an outcome is likely) in the context of something close to full employment in 2022 and thus a forecast of a rate hike in 2022 would be appropriate policy. Remember too that the Fed will not view this as slamming on the brakes. In the context of the forecasted period of elevated inflation, a single rate hike is a very dovish policy.

Admittedly, there is also a numbers game at play here. Only two dots need to shift off zero to get a partial rate hike in the median, three for a full rate hike. The above logic doesn’t need to be adopted by all eleven participants who in June expected no rate hike in 2022, just three of them.
Also contentious is the question of the 2024 dots. I think the consensus is that the 2023 dots will reveal another two hikes. For 2024, there is an argument that the Fed will signal another four hikes. The logic here – again, entirely reasonable – is that the Fed will be intentionally behind the inflation curve and consequently will need to move policy rates quickly up to neutral to stave off inflationary pressures. Surely this is the thinking of a least a minority of FOMC participants and will be evident in the upper range of the dots. I expect a more dovish reaction function in which the median policy maker anticipates only another two rate hikes in 2024. I think in the context of the new policy framework, the median policy maker will anticipate a more gradual return to the neutral rate, driven both by a desire to not slam the brakes on the economy and the short distance to neutral. Also, pulling the lift off into 2022 could be seen as a risk management exercise that allows for a more dovish path of subsequent rate hikes. That said, I admit to not being entirely confident on the 2024 dots. I think four hikes is too aggressive but the risk to my outlook is that the median policy maker anticipates three hikes in 2024.

In the interest of efficiency and time I thought we might share a few brief highlights of key market related points in (and not in) our reports while addressing some market rumors and chatter. Please let us know if you find them helpful, and we wish you in the meantime a good weekend.

*Debt ceiling suspension will probably be included in a Continuing Resolution going out to December. Beyond that there is no plan yet.

To that, reports that US officials are pressing China to remove subsidies on certain industries as a prerequisite to the removal of sanctions can be discounted out of hand as a non-starter. Barring an intense escalation of pressure, that simply is not going to happen, certainly not in exchange for the removal of tariffs – even the Trump administration’s pressure could not get Beijing to move on subsidies.

We have also heard rumors that former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, who polls just behind front runner Taro Kono, another former Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, and current vaccine czar, may choose not to run.

Ishiba is relatively popular among the rank-and-file LDP members who are not members of parliament, but his group has only 17 lawmakers, which is less than the 20 supporters needed to run the race. Ishiba may announce that he will give up and throw his support to Kono.

That further boosts the likelihood that Kono, who is popular among the general electorate because of his image as a reformer, will win.

Our understanding is that John Kerry, after he arrived in Tianjin on August 31, then set up a virtual meeting with Wang. But the topic of Kerry’s conversation with Wang was not climate, but bilateral relations.

According to Chinese sources, Kerry also asked Wang to convey to Xi that Biden hopes and looks forward to holding bilateral talks with Xi in Rome.
But before the two leaders can meet, the two sides need to show some consensus on major issues.

Separately, President Xi Jinping discussed the US-China tech rivalry, negative list, and opening of China’s markets at a meeting in Zhongnanhai on Friday. Excerpts are included below:
“The most powerful weapon against the US all-round containment of China is to focus our efforts on our own affairs and to strive to develop our economy, high technology, and the military…. Opening up is one of the best weapons against the US to contain China…We must continue to welcome and support the development of foreign enterprises in China including US enterprises as long as do they do not become pawns of Washington against China. Relevant departments should speed up formulating and introducing the 2021 version of the national negative list for foreign investment ASAP.”
Xi added, “The competition between China and the US is fundamentally about talent and high technology…We must always adhere to the development of the industry-oriented real economy, must not learn from the US or must not be capital-oriented. A capital-oriented economy is fragile, built on bubbles and vulnerable to a single blow…
“We must ensure the stability of the financial system and eliminate any potential systemic financial risks firmly, forcefully and in a timely manner. While ensuring an average annual economic growth of five percent in the next 10 years, we must ensure high-quality and steady economic development, and we must never neglect medium – and long-term development goals for the sake of short-term economic growth.

Furthermore, our understanding is that if the Eurozone data stays roughly on expectations over the next two weeks, the ECB will most likely decide to tweak its PEPP purchases modestly downwards for the fourth quarter when the Governing Council meets next on Thursday, September 9.

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell’s remarks will be viewed as the consensus view of the Board. Powell is slated to discuss the economic outlook and it is hard to imagine he could do so without shedding some light on the tapering discussion. Powell can firm up the view that tapering will occur in 2021 simply by reiterating the main themes of the most recent minutes and position the Board as more hawkish than the position elaborated by the most dovish members of the Board. This is my expectation.
Bottom Line: There will be a lot of tapering talk on the “virtual” sidelines at Jackson Hole. The weight of that talk will be on the hawkish side and lean toward tapering this year. Watch for that side, however, to follow Kaplan’s lead and offer additional caveats about the current Covid surge. What we are really looking for, however, is how closely Powell follows the positioning of the minutes and Clarida for evidence that the consensus on the Board is falling in line with a taper this year if Covid allows.